COVID-19 and the Scope of the UN Security Council’s Mandate to Address Non-Traditional Threats to International Peace and Security by Pobjie, Erin
COVID-19 and the Scope of the UN Security
Council’s Mandate to Address Non-Traditional
Threats to International Peace and Security
Erin Pobjie*
Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law





II. COVID-19 as an Endangerment to International Peace and Security 120
1. ‘Threat/Endangerment to International Peace and Security’ vs ‘Threat to the Peace’ 120
2. Transnational Health Crises as Endangerments to International Peace and Security 123
3. The Scope of the Security Council’s Mandate under Article 24(1) 125
4. General Powers Stemming from Article 24(1) 126
5. Conclusion 129
III. Interpretation of ‘International Peace and Security’ in Article 24(1) 130
1. UN Charter Interpretation 130
2. Security Council Resolutions as ‘Subsequent Practice’ 132
3. Evolution of the Interpretation of ‘International Peace and Security’ 133
4. Security Council Practice Addressing Transnational Health Crises 136
5. Conclusion 139
IV. Implications 140
1. Risk of Securitisation of Global Health 141
2. Potential for Global Coordination of Response 142
3. Challenges of Coordination between Specialised UN Agencies 143
4. Implications for Collective Security Framework 144
5. Conclusion 145
V. Conclusion: Reconceptualising Collective Security and the Role of the Security
Council 146
Abstract
In Resolution 2532 (2020), the UN Security Council characterised the
COVID-19 pandemic as an endangerment to international peace and security
and, for the first time, demanded a general ceasefire and humanitarian pause
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in armed conflicts across the globe. This article analyses the resolution and its
broader implications. In particular, it examines the significance of the Coun-
cil’s characterisation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the binding powers of the
Security Council for addressing threats to international peace and security
which are not ‘threats to the peace’, and the implications for the Council’s
mandate and the collective security framework. This article argues that the
concept of ‘international peace and security’ under Article 24(1) of the Uni-
ted Nations (UN) Charter – rather than Article 39 ‘threats to the peace’ – is
fundamental to the delimitation of the Security Council’s mandate and
powers for addressing non-traditional threats to international peace and
security such as pandemics and the climate crisis.
Keywords
COVID-19 – Resolution 2532 – Security Council – threat to international
peace and security – threat to the peace
I. Introduction
On 1 July 2020, for the first time in its history, the United Nations
Security Council adopted a resolution demanding a general ceasefire and
humanitarian pause in armed conflicts across the globe. At this point, the
general context of UN Security Council Resolution 25321 – the global
COVID-19 pandemic – is a matter of shared experience and is well known.
Readers will recall that on 11 March 2020, the World Health Organisation
(WHO) declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic. The UN Secretary
General António Guterres took the initiative twelve days later to call for a
global ceasefire to focus efforts on fighting the pandemic and open humani-
tarian corridors to deliver aid to those most vulnerable.2 The UN General
Assembly followed by passing Resolution 74/270 on 2 April calling for
‘intensified international cooperation to contain, mitigate and defeat the
pandemic’.3 Amidst exponentially rising case numbers, fatalities and increas-
ingly apparent global consequences of the pandemic, the Security Council
remained frustratingly silent, embroiled in political disagreements between
its permanent members, most notably China and the United States. Finally,
1 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020).
2 ‘The fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war’, <www.un.org>, 23 March 2020.
3 ‘Global solidarity to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)’, UN Doc. A/RES/
74/270.
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on 1 July 2020, this impasse was broken and the Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 2532. Though its practical and symbolic impact was
vastly diminished by the delay in the Council’s response, the resolution is
still highly significant. In Resolution 2532, the Security Council ‘[c]onsider[s]
that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to en-
danger the maintenance of international peace and security’,4 and took mea-
sures including to ‘demand[…] a general and immediate cessation of hostili-
ties in all situations on its agenda’5 and to ‘call[…] upon all parties to armed
conflicts to engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause for at least
90 consecutive days, in order to enable the safe, unhindered and sustained
delivery of humanitarian assistance, provisions of related services by impar-
tial humanitarian actors, in accordance with the humanitarian principles of
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and medical evacua-
tions, in accordance with international law, including international humani-
tarian law and refugee law as applicable’.6
The Security Council’s characterisation of the COVID-19 pandemic as an
endangerment of international peace and security and not a ‘threat to the
peace’ under Article 39 of the Charter gives rise to important legal implica-
tions. First of all, as will be shown, this characterisation relates to Article 24(1)
of the UN Charter and constitutes subsequent practice in its interpretation.
As this paper argues, Article 24(1) sets out the scope of the Security Council’s
mandate and gives rise to general express and implied powers, which the
Council may exercise to make binding decisions outside Chapter VII. Reso-
lution 2532 thus contributes to an evolutive interpretation of the scope of the
Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security. This ex-
panded notion of ‘international peace and security’ has implications not only
for the role of the Security Council in addressing non-conventional global
threats but also for the collective security framework of the United Nations.
It therefore represents a risk but also an opportunity for reimagining the
protected object of this framework, beyond military security towards a
broader understanding of human security. This article argues that the concept
of ‘international peace and security’ under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter
– rather than Article 39 ‘threats to the peace’ – is fundamental to the delimita-
4 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 11, emphasis added.
5 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), para. 1.
6 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), para. 2. Other measures include requests that the Secretary-
General provide updates and the coordination of the response within the UN system including
UN Country Teams (paras. 4 and 5), and to instruct peace-keeping operations to support host
country authorities and the protection of safety, security and health of UN personnel in UN
peace operations (para. 6) in addition to a general call for action to minimise disproportionate
negative impact of the pandemic on especially vulnerable groups including women and girls
(para. 7).
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tion of the Security Council’s role and powers for addressing non-traditional
threats to international peace and security such as pandemics and the climate
crisis. To wit: what is the meaning of ‘international peace and security’? What
action may the Council take with respect to acts which endanger interna-
tional peace and security but which it does not characterise as a ‘threat to the
peace’ under Chapter VII, and are those measures binding on UN Member
States? And what are the implications of these answers for the role of the UN
Security Council, as well as more broadly for the collective security system
enshrined in the UN Charter? This article addresses these questions through
the lens of Resolution 2532 and the role of the Security Council in addressing
the COVID-19 pandemic.
II. COVID-19 as an Endangerment to International Peace
and Security
The most legally interesting feature of Resolution 2532 is its characterisa-
tion of the COVID-19 pandemic as ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security’7 and not as a ‘threat to the peace’. This is a
legally significant distinction for two reasons: firstly, it means that, together
with the precedents of the Council addressing transnational health crises,
Resolution 2532 counts as subsequent practice affecting the interpretation of
the concept of ‘international peace and security’ in the UN Charter. This in
turn affects the scope of the Security Council’s mandate in Article 24(1),
which confers upon it primary responsibility to maintain international peace
and security and is also the basis for its general express and implied powers.
1. ‘Threat/Endangerment to International Peace and Security’
vs ‘Threat to the Peace’
Due to its pivotal role in empowering the Security Council to take en-
forcement action under Chapter VII, much scholarly attention has been
devoted to the meaning of ‘threat to the peace’, the extent of the Council’s
discretion in interpreting this term and its justiciability.8 However, the litera-
7 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 11.
8 See Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’, in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte,
Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Com-
mentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 1272 – 1296 for further extensive
references.
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ture often conflates ‘threats to international peace and security’ with ‘threats
to the peace’.9 This conflation of the two terms in scholarship reflects incon-
sistent practice by the Council itself in the usage of these terms: in some
resolutions which are cited as part of a trend towards an expansion of the
concept of ‘threats to the peace’, such as Resolution 794 (1992) on Somalia,
Resolution 955 (1994) on Rwanda, Resolution 1529 (2004) on Haiti, and
Resolution 1735 (2006) on Al-Qaida and the Taliban, the Security Council
characterises the situation as a ‘threat to international peace and security’
rather than a ‘threat to the peace’ but still explicitly calls for Chapter VII
measures to be adopted. This inconsistent usage of terms may reflect the way
resolutions are drafted through negotiation and political compromise, usually
not by lawyers,10 and may even be a form of constructive ambiguity leaving
open the interpretation without explicitly stating that a resolution is adopted
under Chapter VII when there is a lack of consensus among Council mem-
bers.
Based on the escalation in measures available in response, it is a reasonable
interpretation that the threshold of ‘threat to the peace’ is higher, requiring a
higher degree of risk (in terms of likelihood of its materialisation) and a
higher magnitude of risk (level of damage), than for a finding of an endanger-
ment to the maintenance of international peace and security.11 Alternatively,
it could be objected that the latter term requires that two conditions must be
cumulatively satisfied, namely an endangerment to peace as well as to securi-
ty, resulting in a higher threshold than for a ‘threat to the peace’. But
arguably the word ‘and’ in the term ‘international peace and security’ in the
9 For example, the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law entry of Erika De
Wet, ‘Peace, Threat To’ in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) MPEPIL (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2015), 3, para. 8, lists examples of ‘threats to the peace’ in the Security Council’s practice which
were in fact characterised not as ‘threats to the peace’ but ‘threats to international peace and
security’, such as illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (UN Doc. S/PRST/2006/38
(West Africa), in which ‘The Security Council considers that illicit trafficking in small arms and
light weapons still poses a threat to peace and security in the region’ (para. 6); acts of interna-
tional terrorism (in which the Council stated, ‘terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security’: UN Doc. S/
PRST/2006/30, under agenda item ‘Threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts’), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (UN Doc. S/RES/1467 (2003) in
which the Council held ‘a nuclear test […] would represent a clear threat to international peace
and security’: UN SC ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’: UN Doc. S/PRST/
2006/41).
10 Michael Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ in: Armin von
Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds),Max Planck UNYB, Vol. 2 (Brill: Leiden 1998), 73-95.
11 Leland M. Goodrich and Anne Patricia Simons, The United Nations and the Mainte-
nance of International Peace and Security (Washington: The Brookings Institution 1955), 234,
argue ‘the distinction is primarily a matter of the immediacy and seriousness of the danger to
peace’.
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UN Charter is not conjunctive but disjunctive, referring to international
peace or international security, since the intention is to protect each of these
objects. In any case, the distinction between the two concepts of ‘threat to
the peace’ and ‘threat/endangerment to international peace and security’ is
first of all a political rather than a legal or factual question,12 since the
Security Council has discretion to determine whether a situation is a ‘threat
to the peace’ or a ‘threat to international peace and security’ (or to make no
determination at all).13 Despite having different legal effects, the categories
are ‘not clearly defined’.14 The result is that the choice between the two
labels is based on a potentially ‘unpredictable and arbitrary’ exercise of
discretionary powers based on political considerations.15 The extent of the
Council’s discretion in this respect and its justiciability remain controver-
sial.16 In any case, while overlapping (in the sense that all ‘threats to the
peace’ are ‘threats to international peace and security’ while the reverse it not
necessarily the case) and comprising discretionary categories, ‘threats to the
peace’ and ‘threats to international peace and security’ are distinct legal
categories under the UN Charter,17 giving rise to distinct legal consequences
for the Council’s functions and powers. It is therefore important to be
precise in the analysis of Security Council resolutions and pay attention to
whether they characterise a dispute or situation as a ‘threat to the peace’
12 As Nigel White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of Interna-
tional Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1997), 37, noted ‘there is
often no substantive factual distinction between the two. They are, in effect, often merely
“labels” put into the resolutions to indicate the political climate in the Council.’ See also ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber of 2 October 1995) (‘Tadic case’), case no. IT-94-1-AR72,
para. 29: ‘The situations justifying resort to the powers provided for in Chapter VII are a
“threat to the peace”, a “breach of the peace” or an “act of aggression”. While the “act of
aggression” is more amenable to a legal determination, the “threat to the peace” is more of a
political concept. But the determination that there exists such a threat is not a totally unfettered
discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits of the Purposes and Principles
of the Charter.’
13 Hans Kelsen The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental
Problems (London: London Institute of World Affairs 1950), 26-27, argued that ‘[i]t is com-
pletely within the discretion of the Security Council to decide what constitutes a “threat to the
peace”’.
14 Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era:
Applying the Principle of Legality (Leiden: Brill 2006), 50.
15 Manusama (n. 14), 50; Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the
Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala: Och Justus Forlag 1998), 103.
16 See De Wet (n. 9), 4, para. 16 for a discussion of both sides of the debate.
17 Original proposals for the drafting of the UN Charter linked the two concepts, empowe-
ring the Security Council to find a ‘threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security’ if dispute resolution failed or was not complied with; this was dropped because it was
seen as fettering the discretion of the Council: White (n. 12), 37.
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under Article 39, or as an endangerment of international peace and security
in the sense of Article 24(1).
2. Transnational Health Crises as Endangerments to Interna-
tional Peace and Security
The scale and global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the
severity of the threat that phenomena and situations falling outside the
traditional military security paradigm can pose to international peace and
security. Already the COVID-19 pandemic (and the responses and reactions
to it) has had an adverse impact on traditional security issues. Existing
geopolitical tensions have been heightened and State-sponsored actors appear
to be exploiting vulnerabilities created by the health crisis to intervene in
other States and create destabilising effects by spreading coronavirus-related
disinformation and carrying out cyber attacks. The pandemic has also lead to
the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in conflict settings such as in
Yemen and served as a conflict multiplier by exacerbating indicators of
violence such as unemployment, inequality, social stigma and distrust in
public institutions.18 In Darfur, Sudan, the pandemic has led to delays in the
completion of the Juba peace process, and concerns have been raised about
increased risk of attacks by Al-Shabaab in Somalia to exploit the current
situation.19 The UN Secretary-General identified key risks created by the
COVID-19 pandemic, including further erosion of trust in public institutions
through mismanagement or lack of transparency; major stressors caused by
economic fallout, especially in fragile societies, less developed and transition-
ing countries; political tensions, and lack of legitimacy in relation to elections;
in some conflict settings, increased incentives for some actors to exploit
division, leading to escalation in violence; exploitation of the situation by
terrorists to strike while attention is diverted to the pandemic; increased risk
of bioterrorist attacks; international, regional, and national peace efforts are
hindered and human rights challenges are being triggered or exacerbated by
the pandemic.20
18 Germany’s concept note for the high-level open debate of the Security Council on the
theme ‘Pandemics and security’, to be held on 2 July 2020 at 10 a. m., UN Doc. S/2020/571, 23
June 2020, paras 3-6.
19 Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council Open Video-Teleconference on the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Implications of COVID-19 [as delivered], 2
July 2020, <www.un.org>.
20 Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council on the COVID-19 Pandemic [as
delivered], 9 April 2020, <www.un.org>.
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COVID-19 and other transnational health crises have thus far been deter-
mined by the Council implicitly or explicitly to be threats or endangerments
to international peace and security and not ‘threats to the peace’ under
Article 39 of the Charter. In Resolution 2532, the Security Council charac-
terised the COVID-19 pandemic as ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security’, and not as a ‘threat to the peace’ under
Chapter VII. This wording exactly repeats the formulation in Article 33,
which refers to ‘any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security’. This characterisation of
the COVID-19 pandemic indicates that the resolution was not adopted under
Chapter VII (threat to the peace) but under Chapter VI of the Charter. The
provision under which the resolution was adopted is discussed further below.
The three previous Security Council resolutions addressing transnational
health crises also did not characterise those epidemics as ‘threats to the peace’
under Article 39. The Security Council has previously addressed transna-
tional health crises in Resolution 1983 (2011) in response to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic,21 as well as in response to Ebola outbreaks in West Africa in
Resolution 2177 (2014)22 and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
in Resolution 2439 (2018).23 In Resolution 1983 (2011), the Council did not
mention a threat to the peace or threat to international peace and security,
but referred to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.24 This implicitly characterises the HIV epidemic as a
threat to international peace and security. The non-imperative language of
the operative part of the resolution (underlines, notes, recognises, stresses,
requests, encourages, welcomes, invites) further strongly suggests that the
resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII. The two Security Council
resolutions concerning Ebola differ in terms of their context and the Coun-
cil’s characterisation of the epidemic. Resolution 2177 concerned the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa (Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Côte d’I-
voire, and Senegal) in 2014, whereas Resolution 2439 was in response to the
Ebola outbreak in the DRC in 2018 during an ongoing situation of armed
conflict and violence. In Resolution 2177 (2014), the Council ‘[r]ecall[ed] its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity’25 and ‘determin[ed] that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak
in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security’26 – not a
21 UN Doc. S/RES/1983 (2011).
22 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014).
23 UN Doc. S/RES/2439 (2018).
24 UN Doc. S/RES/1983 (2011), Preambular para. 16.
25 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular para. 2.
26 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular para. 5.
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‘threat to the peace’.27 In Resolution 2439 (2018), the Council did not directly
recognise Ebola as a threat to international peace and security. Instead, the
Council ‘recall[ed] its determination in resolution 2409 (2018) that the situa-
tion in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and
security in the region’.28
3. The Scope of the Security Council’s Mandate under
Article 24(1)
The fact that the Security Council either implicitly or explicitly charac-
terised each of the epidemics (HIV/AIDS and the Ebola outbreaks in West
Africa in 2014 and DRC in 2018) as well as the COVID-19 pandemic as
threats to international peace and security or as likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security rather than as ‘threats to the
peace’ under Article 39 relates to the scope of ‘international peace and
security’ in Article 24(1) of the Charter. Despite the variation in wording,
‘likely to endanger international peace and security’ and ‘threat to interna-
tional peace and security’ have the same meaning under the UN Charter29
and are thus both relevant to the scope of Article 24(1) (though the latter
term is in addition of particular relevance to Chapter VI). Article 24(1)
provides: ‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf.’
As the rest of this section will argue, Article 24(1) sets out the mandate (i. e.
general competence) of the Security Council and, as explained further below,
is also a source of binding decisions under Article 25. In his commentary on
the UN Charter, Hans Kelsen canvassed the interpretive possibilities of Article
24(1), including that it ‘may be interpreted to confer on the Security Council
the competence to maintain peace by the means determined in Article 1,
27 Ilja Richard Pavone, ‘Ebola and Securitization of Health: UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 2177/2014 and Its Limits’ in: Leonie Vierck, Pedro A. Villarreal and A. Katarina Weilert
(eds), The Governance of Disease Outbreaks (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017), 301-326 (319), with
further citations: ‘Some scholars retain […] that Resolution 2177 was adopted not within
Chapter VII, but within Chapter VI of the UN Charter.’
28 UN Doc. S/RES/2409 (2018), Preambular para. 3, emphasis added.
29 Kelsen (n. 13), 362-363, noting the inconsistency of terms used throughout the Charter
to ‘characterise the dangerous character of disputes or other situations’ including Article 1(1);
11(3); 14; 33(1); 34; 35(1); 36(1); 37(2) and concluding ‘[t]here is hardly any essential difference
between the nature of the disputes and other situations characterised by the different formulas’.
COVID-19 and the Scope of the UN Security Council’s Mandate 125
DOI 10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117 ZaöRV 81 (2021)
https://doi.org/10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117, am 30.04.2021, 23:32:58
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
paragraph 1, of the Charter’.30 However, he also acknowledged the alternative
possibility that it ‘was intended only to stress the political importance of the
Council, not to establish a positive legal effect’.31 This would suggest that
Article 24(1) only sets out the general responsibilities of the Council, with the
actual bases of competence contained in other Charter provisions such as
Article 24(2).32 But Article 24(1) is not only a chapeau: it is the basis for the
Security Council’s legal mandate and confers general competence in addition
to the specific powers set out in other Charter provisions. By referring to the
discharge of ‘duties’, Article 24(1) implies that the Security Council is charged
with these duties in the first place. Furthermore, an argument can be made a
contrario that Article 24(2) sets out ‘the specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of these duties’ precisely because a general power is
conferred in Article 24(1). This argument is strongly supported by the fact –
also acknowledged by Kelsen – that Article 24(2) is clearly not an exhaustive
list of the Council’s powers granted for this function.33
Article 24(1) itself also limits the action of the Security Council. The
practice of the Council bears out the interpretation of Article 24(1) as placing
a limit on what the Council may put on its agenda. Hence, with respect to
some non-traditional security issues, Council members have disputed
whether the item can be considered by the Council at all. This was the case
for the HIV/AIDS epidemic,34 and more recently with respect to the climate
crisis.35 By discussing matters in these terms, and also in its declarations that
particular situations constitute a threat to international peace and security
and in recalling in resolutions its primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, the Council is implicitly referring to the
scope of its mandate set out in Article 24(1).
4. General Powers Stemming from Article 24(1)
It is important to consider the Security Council’s overall mandate under
Article 24(1) and not only the trigger for Chapter VII enforcement powers
30 Kelsen (n. 13), 283.
31 Kelsen (n. 13), 283.
32 Kelsen (n. 13), 283.
33 Kelsen (n. 13), 284; see also Anne Peters, ‘Article 24’ in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus
Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 761-786, margin
note 58.
34 See Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2004), 172-174.
35 Benjamin Pohl and Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth, Summary: UN SC Open Debate on
Climate and Security, 24 July 2020.
126 Pobjie
ZaöRV 81 (2021) DOI 10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117
https://doi.org/10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117, am 30.04.2021, 23:32:58
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
under Article 39, because Article 24(1) is a source of general express and
implied powers of the Security Council, including the power to adopt binding
decisions. There are three tiers or triggers for Security Council involvement
which empower the Council to take certain types of measures. Its broadest
sphere of competence is that set out in Article 24(1), namely, the maintenance
of international peace and security. This is the argument just made above.
The precondition for the exercise of this competence – an endangerment to
international peace and security – is discussed further in the next section. The
current part will focus on the powers conferred by Article 24(1) once this
precondition arises. The second type of competence of the Security Council
is enlivened once there is ‘any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute’.36 In such cases, the Council
may investigate ‘in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security’,37 or make recommendations under Article 36(1) (or under Articles
37 and 38 with respect to pacific settlement of disputes). Finally, the Security
Council is empowered to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII once
there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under
Article 39. Such measures are only permissible under Chapter VII.
Resolution 2532 demonstrates the potential for the Council to make bind-
ing decisions outside Chapter VII to address new types of threats. Security
Council resolutions (or parts of them) are binding when they constitute a
‘decision’ of the Council under Article 25. In its Namibia Advisory Opinion,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that decisions outside Chapter
VII can also be binding.38 In terms of assessing the legal nature of a Security
Council resolution, the ICJ held in theNamibia Advisory Opinion that:
‘The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully
analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the
nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact
36 UN Charter, Article 34.
37 UN Charter, Article 34.
38 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (‘Namibia Adviso-
ry Opinion’), ICJ Reports 1971, 16, para. 113. For instance, Chapter VI resolutions can be
binding. Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are
Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?’, ICLQ 21 (1972), 270-286; Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’
in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessen-
dorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2012), 787-854, 794, margin notes 13 and 14; Theodor Schweisfurth, ‘Article
34’ in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai
Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2012), 1086-1107, margin note 42.
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exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the
resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions
invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.’39
It is possible though unclear whether the measures called for in Resolution
2532, namely, the demand for a global ceasefire and humanitarian pause, are
legally binding.40 It is likely that they were enacted either under Article 36 of
the Charter and are therefore non-binding ‘recommendations’ under that
provision41 or under Article 24(1) itself in combination with its implied
powers.
In addition to the express powers granted by the Charter, particularly
under Chapters VI and VII, the Security Council also has implied powers
stemming from its general responsibilities under Article 24(1). Such powers
may extend beyond its Chapter VI investigative and recommendatory
powers, but do not encompass the enforcement action foreseen in Articles
41 and 42. Limits to the Council’s powers are discussed in Section III below.
According to this argument, the Security Council has implied powers which
derive solely from Article 24(1) and may be binding ‘decisions’ under
Article 25 because, as noted above, Article 24(2) is not an exhaustive list of
Security Council powers in exercising its functions. As the ICJ held in its
Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion: ‘Under international law, the
Organisation must be deemed to have those powers which, though not
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.’42 This was
applied by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion with respect to the
Security Council, when it held that ‘[a]rticle 24 of the Charter vests in the
Security Council the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in
the present case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to express
powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does
not exclude the existence of implied powers to discharge the responsibilities
conferred in paragraph 1.’43
39 Namibia Advisory Opinion (n. 38), para. 114.
40 See Erin Pobjie, ‘Covid-19 as a Threat to International Peace and Security: The Role of
the UN Security Council in Addressing the Pandemic’, 27 July 2020, <www.ejiltalk.org>.
41 Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte,
Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Com-
mentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 1119-1145 (1145), margin note 76:
‘In subsequent practice States have repeatedly emphasized the non-binding character of the SC
recommendations under Art. 36.’
42 13 July 1954, ICJ Reports 1954, at 47.
43 Namibia Advisory Opinion (n. 38), para. 110.
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As Thomas Giegerich explains, this means that the Security Council may
act under its express powers set out in Article 24(2) or under implied powers
under Article 24(1).44 ‘It also explains the considerable number of resolutions
which were not adopted under Chapter VII and obviously concern either
“disputes” or “situations” in the sense of Art. 36 (1), but which neither
recommend any method of settlement, as foreseen in the latter provision, nor
any terms of settlement pursuant to Art. 37 (2) or Art. 38. The legal basis of
those resolutions can only be the general power of the SC flowing from
Art. 24 (1).’45 Nigel White argues that ‘the Western insistence that only
Chapter VII resolutions are binding has resulted in an artificial approach to
the Charter’, and that many resolutions presumed to be under Chapter VII,
including the resolutions dealing with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait46 and the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda respectively47 ‘are really examples of the Council’s general
powers to maintain and restore international peace and security derived from
Article 24 which are clearly intended to be binding by Article 25’.48 In the
same way, the demand for a global ceasefire in Resolution 2532 could also be
an example of the exercise of the Council’s general and implied powers to
maintain international peace and security provided by Article 24(1) and
binding under Article 25. This highlights the practical importance of under-
standing the scope of its mandate under Article 24(1) and not only with
respect to ‘threats to the peace’ under Article 39.
5. Conclusion
The Security Council has thus far characterised all transnational health
crises it has dealt with, including the COVID-19 pandemic, as threats to/
endangerment of international peace and security under Article 24(1) and not
‘threats to the peace’ under Article 39. The previous focus on traditional
security threats and corresponding coercive measures under Chapter VII
resulted in scholars focusing their attention on Article 39 ‘threat to the peace’.
However, it is Article 24(1) that sets out the mandate of the Security Council,
providing that it has primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. Therefore, this practice of the Council affects the
44 Giegerich (n. 41), 1123, margin note 13.
45 Giegerich (n. 41), 1123-1124, margin note 9, footnotes omitted.
46 Namely, UN SC Res. 664 (1990), 667 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990) and 687 (1990).
47 UN SC Res. 827 (1993) and 955 (1994).
48 White (n. 12), 63, footnotes omitted.
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interpretation of Article 24(1) and accordingly, the scope of its mandate. As
this section has argued, the Council’s general express and implied powers
under Article 24(1) may include the power to issue binding (though non-
coercive) legal acts, even in situations which are not a ‘threat to the peace’
under Article 39, to address situations which endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. It is therefore important to pay attention to
the scope of Article 24(1).
III. Interpretation of ‘International Peace and Security’ in
Article 24(1)
Resolution 2532 consolidates a trend towards a broader, human security-
based interpretation of ‘international peace and security’ in the UN Charter.
This correspondingly broadens the mandate of the Security Council under
Article 24(1) (the implications of which are addressed further in Section IV).
The following section discusses the original intended meaning of this term in
the Charter, argues that an evolutionary interpretation is to be preferred, and
that the practice of the Council in interpreting its own mandate is relevant
‘practice’ for this purpose. It then demonstrates that this practice – including
the resolutions on transnational health crises – indicates a limited evolution
in interpretation from the original meaning of military threats, to a broader
understanding which mirrors a corresponding expansion in the understand-
ing of ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39.
1. UN Charter Interpretation
As a multilateral treaty, the UN Charter is subject to the general law of
treaty interpretation.49 This is likely to be a rule of customary international
law,50 as confirmed by the approach of the ICJ.51 The general rules of treaty
49 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 5.
50 Georg Nolte, ‘Third Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in
Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties’, A/CN.4/683, International Law Commission, 7
April 2015, 32-33, paras 83-85; See also Georg Witschel, ‘Article 108’ in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-
Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of
the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 2199,
2204, margin note 8.
51 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1996, 226, para. 19, also with respect to the UN Charter: ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United
Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, 151, 157.
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interpretation are laid out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which are applicable to the UN Charter as
customary rules.52 According to Article 31(1), ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose’. In 1951, Kelsen noted that ‘[i]n ordinary use of language “interna-
tional peace” is a condition of absence of force in the relations among
states’.53
However, because of the Charter’s unique nature as a constituent instru-
ment of an international organisation, an evolutive interpretation is to be
preferred over a static interpretation emphasising the original meaning of the
terms used or the drafters’ intentions. According to the ICJ in the Legality of
the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion,
such constitutional treaties have a hybrid nature which need a dynamic
(evolutive) interpretation.54 A dynamic approach to the interpretation of
Article 24(1) is further supported by the use of a term which is very general
and ‘whose meaning is inherently more context-dependent’, as it indicates an
intention of the parties at the time of concluding the treaty that the inter-
pretation change over time.55 The term ‘international peace and security’ in
Article 24(1) is general and context-dependent and its interpretation will
change according to new types of threats which emerge, including due to
technological advances or threats of a nature that were unforeseen at the time
of drafting the Charter.
52 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Sub-
sequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, with Commentaries, adopted by
the ILC at its seventieth session, (2018), ILCYB 2018, Vol. II, Part 2, conclusion 2(1).
53 Kelsen (n. 13), 19; see also Manusama (n. 14), 32, footnotes omitted: ‘If looked upon from
a historical perspective, the phrase “international peace and security” was usually linked with
the presence or absence of war or armed conflict between states, not with internal disorder. In
this sense, “peace” denotes the absence of inter-state armed conflict, or “negative peace”, and
“security” denotes “the activity which is necessary for maintaining the conditions of peace”, or
“positive peace”.’
54 ICJ Reports 1996, 66, para. 19; see also Thilo Rensmann, ‘Reform’ in: Bruno Simma,
Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2012), 31-32, margin note 20, footnotes omitted: ‘The practical quality of the UN Charter as
the constitution of the UN and the international community at large provides additional
support for considering the Charter to be a “living instrument” which must be “capable of
growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often
unimagined by its framers”.’
55 Georg Nolte, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in
Relation to Treaty Interpretation’, International Law Commission, 19 March 2013, 26, paras 56
and 61.
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2. Security Council Resolutions as ‘Subsequent Practice’
Furthermore, ‘as the Security Council is charged with maintaining and
restoring international peace and security […] [i]t is the extent of the Coun-
cil’s practice that must determine what constitutes international peace and
security’.56 As an organ of the United Nations, the Council’s practice in
interpreting and applying Article 24(1) is a ‘relevant means of interpretation’
under the VCLT, although the precise legal basis for this remains debated
among legal scholars.57 According to the International Law Commission,
‘[t]he possible relevance of an international organisation’s “own practice” can
[…] be derived from Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.’58
The jurisprudence of the ICJ shows that practice of organs of the United
Nations such as the Security Council in the application of the Charter may
be relevant as a form of other subsequent practice under Article 32 of the
VCLT (i. e. as a supplementary means of interpretation), independently of
the practice or acceptance of all parties to the UN Charter.59 Such resolutions
will carry more weight when they deal with an area for which the burden of
obligation falls on those bodies, such as the Council’s practice in determining
its own jurisdiction under Article 24(1): as the ICJ held in the Certain
Expenses Advisory Opinion, ‘[a]s anticipated in 1945 […] each organ must, in
the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction’.60
Furthermore, when a UN Security Council resolution is adopted without
dissenting votes and is accompanied by the general acceptance of UN Mem-
ber States, this may be considered as potentially relevant subsequent practice
under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. Georg Nolte observes that the ICJ
applied this approach in its Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court
interpreted the term ‘concurring votes’ in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter as
including voluntary abstentions ‘primarily by relying on the practice of the
organ concerned in combination with the fact that it was then “generally
accepted” by member States’.61 Nolte notes that ‘“[g]eneral acceptance”
requires “at a minimum” acquiescence’.62 Inger Österdahl argues that Securi-
ty Council resolutions are relevant subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b)
56 Manusama, (n. 14), 32.
57 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions with Commentaries (2018) (n. 52),
Commentary to Conclusion 12, para. 32.
58 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions with Commentaries (2018) (n. 52),
Commentary to Conclusion 12, para. 34.
59 Nolte, Third Report (n. 50), 16-19, paras 43-51.
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n. 49), 168.
61 Nolte, Third Report (n. 50), 19, para. 52.
62 Nolte, Third Report (n. 50), 30, para. 80, footnote omitted.
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even if the resolutions are not unanimous, since all Members of the UN
consent to this system of decision-making under the Charter.63
The Security Council thus has a wide discretion to shape the interpretation
of the scope of its own powers through its practice. However, such discretion
is not unlimited; although it is a political body it is not outside the law.64
Limits to its powers include those explicitly set out in the UN Charter itself,
such as the domestic jurisdiction clause in Article 2(7),65 Article 24(2) (‘[i]n
discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’) and Article 25 (‘in accor-
dance with the present Charter’).66 Further limitations that have been sug-
gested include jus cogens67 and the requirements of good faith and doctrine of
abuse of power.68 However, in practical terms, it is unclear what the legal
effect of an ultra vires decision by the Council would be and if this could be
directly adjudicated.69
3. Evolution of the Interpretation of ‘International Peace and
Security’
As argued above, the Security Council’s mandate is set out in Article 24(1)
and a determination that a matter falls within this ambit (because it is a threat
63 Österdahl (n. 15), 91.
64 ICTY, Tadic (n. 12), para. 28: ‘neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of
the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)’; Peters (n. 33), 771, margin note 29;
Manusama (n. 14), 45; Robert Cryer, ‘The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to
Coherence?’, Journal of Armed Conflict Law 1 (1996) 1, 161-195, (167-168).
65 Manusama (n. 14), 33; cf. Cryer (n. 64), 170.
66 Cryer (n. 64), 167-168.
67 Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ICJ, Bosnian Genocide Case, Provisional Mea-
sures, Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 325 (440), para. 100: ‘one only has to
state the opposite proposition thus – that a Security Council resolution may even require
participation in genocide – for its unacceptability to be apparent.’; Cryer (n. 64), 170; Österdahl
(n. 15), 91: jus cogens seems to be the ‘only legal limit really on the freedom of interpretation
and of action in particular of the Security Council’.
68 Cryer (n. 64), 169, although he points out it is hard to prove bad faith. See also Manusama
(n. 14), 45: ‘The limits consist of sovereignty and its corollaries: the sovereign equality of states,
the domestic jurisdiction clause of Article 2(7) and the obligation to perform its functions and
exercise its powers in good faith. Moreover, ius cogens norms and erga omnes obligations, as well
as human rights and international humanitarian law, are incumbent on the Security Council.’
69 See White (n. 12), 67-73; Pemmaraj Sreenivasa Rao, ‘An Indian Perspective’ in: Christian
Tomuschat (ed.), The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Perspective (Leiden: Brill 1995),
143-184 (179); Peters (n. 33), 771, margin notes 29-30. De Wet (n. 34), 129 and 382 concludes
that the ICJ has a limited role in judicial review of Security Council decisions and proposes a
unilateral right of States as a last resort to reject illegal Security Council resolutions.
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or endangerment to international peace and security) means it forms part of
the Council’s practice in interpreting its mandate. This practice has evolved
in response to new types of threats which emerged after the end of the Cold
War from less predictable and disparate sources, including non-State armed
groups.70 The ideological foundation of this trend was arguably the Security
Council Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992,71 in which for the first
time a UN body gave the term ‘international peace and security’ a broad
meaning extending beyond war and military conflicts.72 It stated: ‘[t]he
absence of war and military conflicts among States does not in itself ensure
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in
the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
to peace and security.’73 The previous year, the Council had passed Resolu-
tion 688 characterising massive cross-border refugee flows of Kurds from
Northern Iraq as a threat to international peace and security. In 1992, this
was followed by Resolution 794 authorising US intervention in Somalia in
which the Council characterised ‘the magnitude of the human tragedy caused
by the conflict in Somalia’ as a ‘threat to international peace and security’.74
Resolution 965 (1994) on Rwanda75 and Resolution 1529 (2004) on Haiti76
followed. In 2019, the Council adopted two resolutions addressing wildlife
poaching and trafficking as a factor threatening peace in Central African
Republic77 and the Democratic Republic of Congo78 respectively. From 2001,
the Security Council characterised abstract phenomenon as threats to inter-
national peace and security, including international terrorism, the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, epidemics
and pandemics.79 Christian Tomuschat’s interpretation of Article 33(1) in the
third edition of The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2012)
reflects this change, stating that the narrow interpretation set out in the
previous edition that ‘the criterion of international peace and security’ refers
only to negative peace ‘must be abandoned’.80
70 Pavone (n. 27), 304.
71 UN Doc. S/23500, Decision of 31 January 1992 (3046th meeting), Statement by the
President.
72 Pavone (n. 27), footnote omitted; Peters (n. 33), 772, margin note 34.
73 UN Doc. S/23500 (n. 71), 3.
74 UN Doc. S/RES/794 (1992), Preambular para. 3.
75 UN Doc. S/RES/965 (1994).
76 UN Doc. S/RES/1529 (2004).
77 UN Doc. S/RES/2499 (2019), Preambular paras 11 and 41.
78 UN Doc. S/RES/Res. 2502 (2019), paras. 16 and 45.
79 De Wet (n. 9), 3, para. 9.
80 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Article 33’ in: Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte,
Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Com-
mentary (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 1069-85, margin note 13.
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This evolution in the interpretation of ‘threat to international peace and
security’ is consistent with the concomitant well-known expansion in the
interpretation of ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39.81 Originally used in
the sense of military threats mainly involving cross-border uses of armed
force, the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ has evolved over time, beginning by
the late 1960 s (with the resolution on Southern Rhodesia82) to include a more
positive conception of peace, such as respect for human rights.83 This change
has also included a move away from security threats with transboundary
effects to include internal situations because of their negative impact on the
protected object of international peace in the sense of ‘more positive aspects
of common interests of humanity, there being a threat to the peace if there
are violations of these interests, irrespective of where they occur’.84 An
alternative view is that the Council characterises some internal crises as a
‘threat to the peace’ because of the threat of spillover effects affecting tradi-
tional security interests.85 This raises similar questions as with the interpreta-
tion of ‘threat to international peace and security’ in the Security Council’s
practice, namely, whether the Council is tending toward a conception of
positive peace (protection of human security),86 or if it is rather an expansion
in the origin and scope of potential threats to traditional security interests
(negative peace, but with a broader causal outlook).
81 See White (n. 12) for a good discussion of the evolution of the concept of ‘threats to the
peace’ in Council practice, 42. As with the scope of the Council’s general mandate, the limits to
its discretion in interpreting when there is a ‘threat to the peace’ empowering it to demand
enforcement measures remains debated: De Wet (n. 9), 5, para. 23.
82 UN Doc. S/RES/216 (1965).
83 Cryer (n. 64), 187.
84 Cryer (n. 64), 188.
85 See, e. g., Michael J. Matheson, Council Unbound – The Growth of UN Decision Making
on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2006), 46, who notes that the Council has characterised internal crises as threats to the peace
‘where there was a plausible concern that their continuation might lead to international conflict
or destabilize neighbouring countries’. See also Anne Peters, ‘Novel practice of the Security
Council: Wildlife poaching and trafficking as a threat to the peace’, 12 February 2014,
<www.ejiltalk.org>: ‘Overall, the Charter’s expanded and “positive” notion of peace does not
seem to be devoid of any transboundary element yet.’
86 The UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report defined human security as ‘safety from
chronic threats, hunger, disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful dis-
ruption in the patterns of daily life’. This understanding of human security draws on the
distinction between negative and positive peace developed by Johan Galtung, ‘An Editorial’,
Journal of Peace Research 1 (1964), 1 and the notion of sustainable human development,
including the works of Amartya Sen, and reflects a move away from a conventional military
understanding of threats and response: see Pavone (n. 27), 312-313. See also Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The
Place of Human Security in Collective Security’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 18
(2013), 95-129 (97-100) for an explanation of the concept of human security and how it relates
to securitisation.
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4. Security Council Practice Addressing Transnational Health
Crises
Security Council resolutions addressing transnational health crises
(namely, 1983, 2177, 2439, and 2532) align with this broader trend towards
expanding the interpretation of ‘international peace and security’ under
Article 24(1). This is shown by the factors the Council chose to emphasise
when characterising the respective situations (either implicitly or explicitly)
as threats or endangerments to international peace and security. Over the
course of these precedents, the Council has demonstrated increasing confi-
dence in its legal competence to deal with global public health, but at the
same time, continued to emphasise the links between global public health and
traditional threats to international peace and security. The result is a progres-
sive (though limited) development in the Council’s interpretation of its
mandate to maintain international peace and security.
In the lead up to the adoption of an earlier resolution 1308 (17 July 2000),
for the first time the Security Council debated a health issue – the HIV/AIDS
epidemic – in the context of international peace and security.87 Some scholars
argued that this was outside the scope of the Council’s mandate.88 Resolution
1308 (2000) seems to confirm scepticism about whether the epidemic as such
fell within the scope of the Council’s mandate, focusing as it did on the
‘potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international
peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel’.89 But in 2011, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1983 dealing with the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, thus confirming through its practice the interpretation that the
matter fell within the scope of its mandate. In that second resolution, the
Security Council emphasised several factors, including the high numbers of
infections and deaths (at that time, over 60 million and 25 million respec-
tively),90 the challenges that HIV poses ‘to the development, progress and
stability of societies’91 and the two-way relationship between the epidemic
and situations of conflict.92 Of these, the Council placed the most emphasis
on the latter, ‘[r]ecognizing that the spread of HIV can have a uniquely
devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society, and that in conflict and
post-conflict situations, these impacts may be felt more profoundly’,93 and
87 De Wet (n. 9), 4, para. 13.
88 E.g. Manusama (n. 14), 3.
89 UN Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000), para. 1.
90 Resolution 1983 (2011), Preambular para. 1.
91 Resolution 1983 (2011), Preambular para. 6.
92 Resolution 1983 (2011), Preambular para. 10.
93 Resolution 1983 (2011), Preambular para. 9.
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that in turn, ‘conditions of violence and instability in conflict and post-
conflict situations can exacerbate the HIV epidemic, inter alia, through large
movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, conflict-re-
lated sexual violence, and reduced access to medical care’.94 The Security
Council also recognised ‘the continuing negative impact of HIVon the health
and fitness of UN missions personnel’.95 The measures requested by the
Council further emphasise the connection between HIV and conflict and
peace-building, requesting the Secretary-General to take the impact of HIV
into consideration in his roles relating to conflict and peace-building96 and
focusing on incorporating HIV prevention, treatment and care into peace-
keeping operations and preventing HIV transmission within UN missions.97
This temerity in essentially confining the measures to peace-building mis-
sions reflects the gravity of the health situation within UN missions at that
time,98 but may also reflect early hesitations about whether transnational
health crises fell into the Council’s mandate in the first place.
By 2014, this understanding of the Council’s mandate had progressed and
the next Security Council resolution concerning a transnational health crisis
(the Ebola outbreak in West Africa) was adopted by consensus and supported
by an astounding 130 UN member States.99 In Resolution 2177, the Security
Council again ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] that the peacebuilding and development gains
of the most affected countries concerned could be reversed in light of the
Ebola outbreak and underlin[ed] that the outbreak is undermining the stabil-
ity of the most affected countries concerned and, unless contained, may lead
to further instances of civil unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the
political and security climate’.100 In the resolution, the Council referred to
‘global public health security’101 as well as the impact of the Ebola outbreak
and travel and trade restrictions in response to it on ‘food security’102 and
‘[e]ncourage[d] the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to
continue efforts to resolve and mitigate the wider political, security, socio-
economic and humanitarian dimensions of the Ebola outbreak […]’.103 This
94 Resolution 1983 (2011), Preambular para. 10.
95 Resolution 1983 (2011), para. 1.
96 Resolution 1983 (2011), paras 6 and 7.
97 Resolution 1983 (2011), paras 8 and 9.
98 ‘[A]vailable statistics indicate that health-related issues have become a leading cause of
fatality in the field since 2000’, Preambular para. 14.
99 See Statement by the President of the Security Council of 21 November 2014, UN Doc.
S/PRST/2014/24.
100 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular para. 4.
101 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular para. 5.
102 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular paras 17 and 22.
103 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), para. 2.
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evidences the Council’s broadening understanding of the scope of its own
mandate and the concept of international peace and security. By ‘call[ing] on’
States to lift travel and border restrictions,104 facilitate delivery of assistance
including personnel and supplies,105 enhance communication efforts,106 and
provide urgent resources and assistance including deployable medical capa-
bilities,107 the Council also took more concrete and assertive steps in re-
sponse to the epidemic beyond traditional coercive measures or those focused
on peacekeeping. However, as Ilja Richard Pavone argues, in Resolution
2177, ‘the Security Council did not directly address the disease and its
implications for the health of the populations affected, but rather its political
consequences in terms of possible civil unrests and riots that could have led
to the collapse of the fragile political institutions in the hardest hit coun-
tries’.108
In its next global health resolution 2439 (2018), the Council expressed
‘serious concern regarding the security situation in the areas affected by the
Ebola outbreak, which is severely hampering the response efforts and facil-
itating the spread of the virus in the DRC and the wider region’109 and called
for the ‘immediate cessation of hostilities by all armed groups, including the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)’. The factors that the Security Council
mentioned as well as the measures adopted indicate that unlike Resolution
2177 (2014), Resolution 2439 (2018) was concerned with the context of the
conflict in the DRC and not directly the Ebola outbreak as such. The
Council ‘[e]xpress[ed] grave concern about the most recent outbreak of the
Ebola virus in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the fact that
this epidemic is occurring in the context of much wider humanitarian needs,
in a country whose people have suffered from the recurrence of the disease,
armed conflict and violence for the last few decades’,110 ‘concern that this
security situation negatively impacts the ability to respond to and contain the
outbreak of the Ebola virus’111 and ‘[u]nderscor[ed] the need to address the
security situation in the areas affected by the disease […]’.112 In the first
operative paragraph of the resolution, the Security Council ‘[r]eiterates its
deep concern regarding the overall security and humanitarian situation in the
DRC, exacerbated by destabilising activities of foreign and domestic armed
104 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), para. 4.
105 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), para. 5.
106 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), para. 6.
107 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), para. 7,
108 Pavone (n. 27), 322, footnote omitted.
109 UN Doc. S/RES/2439 (2018), para. 4.
110 Resolution 2177 (2014), Preambular para. 1.
111 Resolution 2177 (2014), Preambular para. 3.
112 Resolution 2177 (2014), Preambular para. 9.
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groups […]’.113 As the resolution makes clear, this security situation included
‘acts of violence, attacks and threats intentionally directed against medical
personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties
[…]’.114 As in the previous Ebola resolution, the Council refers to ‘global
public health security’ and ‘public health threats’.115
In the preamble to its most recent global health resolution, Resolution 2532
(2020), the Security Council emphasised ‘the devastating impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic across the world, especially in countries ravaged by
armed conflicts, or in post-conflict situations, or affected by humanitarian
crises’,116 ‘that conditions of violence and instability in conflict situations can
exacerbate the pandemic, and that inversely the pandemic can exacerbate the
adverse humanitarian impact of conflict situations’,117 and ‘that the peacebuild-
ing and development gains made by countries in transition and post-conflict
countries could be reversed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak’.118
In doing so, the Security Council appears to place importance on the impact of
the pandemic in conflict and post-conflict situations, and the mutual relation-
ship between the pandemic and conditions of violence and instability in
conflict situations. Thus, it seems that the Security Council characterised the
pandemic as likely to endanger international peace and security mainly because
of its impacts on traditional peace and security matters such as situations of
armed conflict as well as on fragile situations of post-conflict and humanitarian
crises which may worsen and destabilise into violence.
5. Conclusion
We can thus distinguish several differences in the Security Council’s char-
acterisation of these transnational health threats, namely, when the Council
considers the disease itself to be a threat to international peace and security,
as in Resolution 2177 (2014) (the Ebola outbreak in West Africa), and when
the effects of the disease in pre-existing situations of armed conflict are
decisive to its characterisation, such as Resolution 2439 (2018) (the Ebola
outbreak in DRC).119 Resolution 2532 appears to fall into the latter category
113 Resolution 2177 (2014), para. 1.
114 Resolution 2177 (2014), Preambular para. 11.
115 Resolution 2177 (2014), Preambular para. 12.
116 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 3.
117 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 4.
118 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 5.
119 Pedro A. Villarreal, ‘The Security Council and Covid-19: Towards a Medicalization of
International Peace and Security’, ESIL Reflection 9 (2021).
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and also bears further similarities to Resolution 2439 in terms of measures
called for, including most notably a ceasefire. Furthermore, each of these four
key resolutions marks a broader and more assertive response by the Security
Council to transnational health crises. However, in light of the relatively
mixed practice, these conclusions must be expressed cautiously.120
Resolution 2532 appears to continue a trend towards a broader concept of
international peace and security beyond conventional security threats. On
the other hand, by emphasising the links between the pandemic and situa-
tions of conflict, post-conflict, and humanitarian crisis, and by focusing its
measures mostly on armed conflicts in situations on its agenda (paras 1 and
2), it rows back on the high point of this trend which seemed to be reached
with Resolution 2177. The overall tendency towards broadening the concept
of international peace and security now seems clearer with this fourth im-
portant Security Council resolution addressing a transnational health crisis,
since the narrowing of the concept in the previous Resolution 2439 through
its emphasis on the military security aspect could be explained by the specific
context in which that outbreak occurred. On the other hand, Resolution
2532 indicates a trend in the practice of the Council towards a narrower form
of this broader concept of human security which continues to recognise non-
military factors that may negatively affect international peace and security in
a sense more restricted to armed conflict and violence. The focus on military
factors may also reflect the limited consensus possible in the context of a
strained geopolitical situation among the permanent members of the Council
and disagreement over how to address the pandemic. In any case, it remains
open to the Council to adopt further resolutions on this pandemic or other
transnational health crises (or indeed, other non-traditional security threats)
which conform to the broader interpretation indicated in previous resolu-
tions.
IV. Implications
The remainder of this article briefly discusses the broader implications and
pros and cons of a more expansive scope of Security Council competence to
address non-traditional security threats, focusing on its response to the
120 Nasu (n. 86), 97 also concludes that ‘UN Member States are in general agreement on
accommodating the narrow conception of human security within the Security Council’s man-
date and have progressively supported the wider conception to inform the exercise of its
mandate, which diverging on how the Security Council should approach human security
issues’.
140 Pobjie
ZaöRV 81 (2021) DOI 10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117
https://doi.org/10.17104/0044-2348-2021-1-117, am 30.04.2021, 23:32:58
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
COVID-19 pandemic in particular. Risks include increasing securitisation
and possible militarisation of the health crisis, stepping on mandates of other
bodies such as the WHO, inappropriateness of Chapter VII coercive mea-
sures to respond to complex crises of this nature and a perceived lack of
legitimacy. On the other hand, the present crisis reveals an opportunity to
reframe and reconceptualise collective security and the Security Council’s
role in confronting new global challenges.
1. Risk of Securitisation of Global Health
The securitisation of global health has been subject to extensive critical
analysis, particularly with regard to the exceptional or emergency powers it
is often used to justify.121 As the securitisation of particular situations is also
shaped by subjective factors (since what is considered a threat is in the eye of
the observer),122 this results in potential arbitrariness as to which situations
are treated as security threats and which are not.123 However, this does not
differ from other situations characterised as threats to international peace and
security, since this is a discretionary decision of the Security Council which is
not necessarily based on empirical assessments.124 As has already been ob-
served at the national level, securitisation of a disease may also lead to
‘draconian emergency responses which are ineffective, counterproductive
and/or unjust’.125 It can also lead to a militarisation of the response rather
than framing an epidemic or pandemic as a humanitarian or health issue,126
121 See, e. g., Tim Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘WHO Decides on the Excep-
tion? Securitization and Emergency Governance in Global Health’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45
(2014), 331-348; Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton, ‘HIV, AIDS and Security: Where are We
Now?’ International Affairs 86 (2010), 225-245; Clare Wenham, ‘The Oversecuritization of
Global Health: Changing the Terms of Debate’, International Affairs 95 (2019), 1093-1110.
122 The theory of securitisation is based on the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap
de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publi-
shers 1998). See also Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The Expanded Conception of Security and International
Law: Challenges to the UN Collective Security System Scientific Article’, Amsterdam Law
Forum 3 (2011), 15-33, applying this theory to different spheres of national and international
security.
123 See Michael J. Selgelid and Christian Enemark, ‘Infectious Diseases, Security and Ethics:
The Case of HIV/AIDS’, Bioethics 22 (2008), 457-465 (459) for an interesting analysis of why
certain diseases and not others are securitised.
124 ‘Empirically, it is virtually impossible to give a general answer to the question of what
kinds of situations, apart of course from obvious direct military threats or attacks, really do
threaten international peace and security.’ Österdahl (n. 15), 86.
125 Selgelid and Enemark (n. 123), 461.
126 Pavone (n. 27), 314.
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with attendant human rights impacts. Placing it within the mandate of a
political body such as the UN Security Council to determine whether partic-
ular infectious diseases constitute a security threat moves the response away
from global health experts and risks politicisation and militarisation.127
2. Potential for Global Coordination of Response
The benefits of the Security Council taking the decision to characterise a
pandemic as a threat to international peace and security are that it ‘may also
raise the political profile of the situation at hand, generating political commit-
ment, mobilising additional financial resources and facilitating the deploy-
ment of military assets with the required logistical, organisational and
enforcement capacity’.128 This opens opportunities for the Security Council
to take on a coordinating role in a global response to a global issue. The
Security Council has itself ‘underscor[ed] that combating this pandemic
requires greater national, regional and international cooperation and solidar-
ity, and a coordinated, inclusive, comprehensive and global international
response with the United Nations playing a key coordinating role’.129 Its
previous resolutions addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic130 and the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa131 also recognised the need for a coordinated interna-
tional response. Although the Council’s delayed response to the COVID-19
pandemic has been criticised as a failure of multilateralism,132 these resolu-
tions themselves show that the Council is signalling the importance of multi-
lateralism, cooperation and solidarity over nationalistic approaches and em-
phasising its role as a global coordinator.
By considering the COVID-19 pandemic as falling within its remit under
Article 24(1) and in exercising its powers under the Charter, the Security
Council could go even further and play a more active global coordination
role in the response to the pandemic. First of all, the Council provides a
forum for facilitating an exchange of views among UN Member States on
‘the security implications of international health threats, epidemics and pan-
127 See Stefan Elbe, ‘Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking
HIV/AIDS and Security’, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), 119-144; Gian Luca Burci,
‘Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health’, 23 December 2014,
<http://www.qil-qdi.org>.
128 Burci (n. 127).
129 UN Doc. S/RES/2532 (2020), Preambular para. 6.
130 Resolution 1983 (2020), Preambular para. 6.
131 UN Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014), Preambular para. 13.
132 Patrick Wintour, ‘What is the Future of the UN in the Age of Impunity?’, The
Guardian, 23 July 2020.
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demics and the corresponding role of the Security Council in maintaining
international peace and security’133 as well as experiences and lessons learned.
By putting a situation on its agenda, holding open debates, adopting resolu-
tions, and remaining seized of a matter, the Council may also raise awareness
and garner international momentum and political support for addressing
certain issues, as was the case with the Ebola outbreak in 2014.134 The
Security Council also clearly has a role to play in ‘promoting and facilitating
the appropriate consideration of the impact of COVID-19 in engendering
effective approaches to peacebuilding and sustaining peace’.135 Beyond peace-
building, the Security Council could also facilitate international cooperation
in logistical matters, for example, by providing a framework (such as a ‘global
goods coordination mechanism’)136 to ensure global access to vaccines and
other medical technology that may be developed to fight the pandemic. This
could overcome concerns of a vaccine ‘arms race’ in which States treat the
development and use of a vaccine as a national security issue or use such
technological advances as political leverage.137
3. Challenges of Coordination between Specialised UN Agencies
This then raises the question of how to delineate fields of competence
between the Security Council and specialised UN agencies such as the WHO
and how to ensure policy coherence between them. The High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change already noted in 2004 the need for coordi-
nation and cooperation between the WHO and the Security Council and the
establishment of procedures for this in response to ‘the intentional release of
an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an
infectious disease’, including information sharing by the WHO to the Securi-
ty Council, support by the Security Council of the WHO’s investigations
and deployment of experts, mandating compliance with the International
Health Regulations (IHRs) (as it did in Resolution 2177 with respect to the
Temporary Recommendations issued under the IHRs) and setting up of
133 Germany’s concept note for the high-level open debate of the Security Council on the
theme ‘Pandemics and security’, (n. 18), para. 10.
134 Pavone (n. 27), 326.
135 Letter Dated 30 July 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/765, para. 5.
136 Rob Berschinsky, ‘UN Security Council Can and Should Create a Global Goods
Coordination Mechanism for Coronavirus’, 24 March 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org>.
137 See James Paton, ‘A Cold War Has Started over Coronavirus Vaccine with Allegations
of Russian Cyberattacks’, ThePrint, 17 July 2020.
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cordons sanitaires.138 However, in marked contrast to its recognition of the
‘central role’ of the WHO with respect to Ebola in Resolution 2177, Resolu-
tion 2532 does not mention the WHO at all.139 The question of the alignment
of roles and responsibilities of UN organs has already been raised with
respect to Ebola and Resolution 2177, as well as during the 2007 debates on
the impact of climate change on international peace and security.140 In partic-
ular, Maurizio Arcari and Paolo Palchetti astutely asked: ‘are the compe-
tences of the interested institutional stakeholder, such as the WHO in the
case at hand, enhanced or threatened by the ever growing tendency of the SC
to cope with questions going well beyond the traditional boundaries of
international peace and security?’141
4. Implications for Collective Security Framework
The scope of the Security Council’s mandate under Article 24(1) may also
affect the interpretation and application of other provisions of the Charter,
including by broadening the overall Purpose of the United Nations and
altering the collective security framework including the prohibition of the
use of force. With respect to the latter, Federica Paddeu has argued that since
Article 2(4) proclaims that uses of force inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations are unlawful and one of those Purposes is the maintenance of
international peace and security, an expansion of the concept of international
peace and security also broadens the scope of the prohibition of the use of
force.142 A more obvious implication for collective security is a possible
expansion of the interpretation of ‘threat to the peace’ if the term ‘peace’ is
interpreted in a consistently broad manner. Sections II and III already dis-
cussed the relationship between these two concepts, which, though distinct
and giving rise to distinct legal consequences, have not been consistently
differentiated in the Council’s practice. However, due to the differing legal
138 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 144.
139 The preamble states that it has ‘considered’ GA Resolution 74/270, which itself recogni-
ses in its preamble ‘the central role of the United Nations system in catalysing and coordinating
the global response to control and contain the spread of COVID-19, and acknowledging in this
regard the crucial role played by the World Health Organization’.
140 Maurizio Arcari and Paolo Palchetti, ‘The Security Council as a Global “Health-
Keeper”? Resolution 2177 (2014) and Ebola as a Threat to the Peace’, Questions of Interna-
tional Law (no. 10 2014).
141 Arcari and Palchetti (n. 140).
142 Federica I. Paddeu, ‘Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons Against Force:
Consent as a Justification for the Use of Force’, Journal on the Use of Force and International
Law 7 (2020), 227-269.
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consequences, there may be less political resistance to characterising non-
traditional security threats such as pandemics and the climate crisis as an
‘endangerment to the maintenance of international peace and security’ rather
than a ‘threat to the peace’ and thus a lower (political) threshold for expand-
ing its scope compared to Article 39.143
In terms of Chapter VII measures, the collective security architecture that
the Security Council exists within was not designed to address these non-
military types of threats and those that do not necessarily emanate from an
identifiable responsible actor, as the sanctions regime envisaged by Chapter
VII makes clear. A feature of these newer, non-traditional security threats
may indeed be that they are not directly attributable to a specific actor but
have more complex causes which are not suitably addressed through coercive
measures. Furthermore, action in response to emerging threats to interna-
tional peace and security through the Security Council may suffer from a
legitimacy deficit since it does not reflect a sovereign equality of States and its
response is clearly shaped by geopolitical agendas especially of its permanent
members. But at the same time, these very features can also have an advantage
since this also empowers the Security Council to take rapid action and ‘fill
gaps’ in international responses.144
5. Conclusion
Although there is an urgent need for global action to address the COVID-
19 pandemic, it is still appropriate and necessary to question the longer-term
institutional impacts of these actions, including with respect to the Security
Council’s role. In particular, it is apt to ask whether the Security Council has
the required resources and competences to address non-traditional threats to
international peace and security, and how multilateral mechanisms can be
established or strengthened in order to facilitate the necessary forms of
cooperation needed to mitigate global crises such as pandemics.145
143 For example, with respect to the Spanish Question (concerning the relationship between
the UN and Francoist Spain and in particular whether the situation in Spain endangered
international peace and security) the Council’s reluctance to make a finding of a ‘threat to the
peace’ was probably based on wariness of imposing coercive measures such as economic
sanctions or military measures under Chapter VII, a factor that White argues continues to
remain ‘[t]he motivating factor behind the Council's finding or not finding a “threat to the
peace”’ (n. 12), 38.
144 Nilüfer Oral, Panel Discussion, UN to 75 online conference, 9 October 2020.
145 Concept note for the Security Council summit-level debate to be held on 24 September
2020 on the theme ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Global Governance after
COVID-19’, UN Doc. S/2020/883, 3 September 2020, para. 12.
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V. Conclusion: Reconceptualising Collective Security and
the Role of the Security Council
The COVID-19 pandemic clearly has grave and far-reaching implications
globally, nationally, and at the individual level, many of which are immediate
and concrete. However, to look beyond the current crisis and consider long-
term consequences for the international legal system and the role of a key
player within it, the UN Security Council, is not to ignore or downplay this
complex reality. Rather, this paper has taken the Security Council’s response
to the pandemic, in the form of Resolution 2532, as a starting point to argue
that the concept of international peace and security – a foundational concept
in the modern international legal and institutional order – is broadening. As
this paper has argued, this correspondingly expands the mandate of the
Council itself, set out in Article 24(1), to maintain international peace and
security. Given that the Security Council is empowered to take broad and
even binding measures in response to situations falling within the scope of its
mandate, including outside Chapter VII, it is relevant to consider which types
of threats fall within this scope.
So far, much of the focus on the Security Council’s competence and
powers has focused on ‘threat to the peace’ and Chapter VII. But in light of
its increasing practice in addressing non-traditional ‘threats to/endanger-
ments of international peace and security’, including Resolution 2532, we
need to better understand the role that the Security Council can play outside
traditional peace and security issues.146 Existential global threats extend be-
yond war and require a global response. The current crisis is an opportunity
to rethink the conception of international peace and security and the role of
the UN Security Council. This corresponds with the overall Purposes of the
United Nations, that beyond pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement
measures, the Organisation ‘also has the purpose and is empowered to take
positive and affirmative action in bringing about the conditions essential for
peace throughout the world and for its enjoyment’.147
146 Oral (n. 144).
147 Goodrich and Simmons (n. 11), 13, citing US Department of State, Charter of the
United Nations, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference,
Publication 2349 (26 June 1945), 68.
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